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I. INTRODUCTION

Innovation continually influences the trajectory of the law. While
common law adapts gradually, statutes catch up only at discrete intervals.
Lags between updates can confuse and frustrate those trying to apply dated
regimes in new contexts. Epitomizing this gap-tension is copyright-once
prominently termed the "metaphysics of the law."' Congress created its
exclusive rights before anyone contemplated today's technology. Three
decades after the latest major revision, activities like using household
electronics, servicing computer systems, and scanning library archives2
* Lecturer, University of Michigan-College of Engineering; Member, State Bar of
Michigan. I am grateful to Jessica Litman for her generous consultation (significant differences
notwithstanding) throughout my development of this Article. I also thank Vanessa Pierce for her
constructive comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Story describes
the challenges of intellectual property law--even in 1841: "Patents and copyrights approach, nearer
than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and,
sometimes, almost evanescent." Id.
2. This refers to a pending suit against the Internet search engine GoogleTM by authors and
publishers objecting to the unauthorized scanning and permanent storage of entire print works for
digital indexing. See Hiawatha Bray, PublishersBattle Google Book Index, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
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can raise vexing issues about the reach of authors' rights. Exclusive
reproduction, or the sole liberty to copy, is the foundational interest. We
even name this area of intellectual property for it. The methodology by
which courts identify reproduction is therefore critical in determining
which public liberties Congress has restricted in order to grant authors a
calculated margin of dominion over their works.
Copyright law enumerates specific exclusive rights which authors
enjoy in original works of authorship.3 Like patents for inventors,
copyrights are monopolies that owners enjoy for a limited time.4 Unlike
patent law, however, copyright law targets only creative expression-not
practical applications or underlying ideas and facts.5 Copyrights now
endure for seventy years beyond the life of the author, without requiring
formalities, rights initiate instantly and automatically upon fixing a
minimally-creative work in any stable, tangible form.6 In addition to
reproduction (my focus in this Article), an owner's bundle of exclusive
rights also includes distribution, derivation, public display, and public
performance. 7 While the term "copying" is often used as shorthand to refer
to any infringement of these five exclusive rights, reproduction is actually
but one of five potential grounds upon which plaintiffs can seek recourse.8
What does it mean to copy? Modem case law too often bypasses this
question, summarily deeming copies to exist wherever creative content is
reused in any way, for any purpose-imparting a broad content-activity
right devoid of statutory support. 9 The scope of the reproduction right
warrants careful scrutiny, and depends upon the construction of the
language Congress has employed over the years to ordain, perpetuate, and
20, 2005. Though early defenses rely on the elusive and unpredictable exception of "fair use"
(arguably a tough sell here, due to the quantity and permanence of the uses as well as the magnitude
of the project), my thesis would call into question whether scanning only for indexing even
constitutes "reproduction" in the first place.
3. Aside from this brief paragraph, I do not provide much general background on copyright
law. The U.S. Copyright Office publishes a basic primer: Circular1, U.S. Copyright Office, Rev:
07/2006,http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circl.html.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). As I mention later, this is a longstanding principle of
copyright theory.
6. See supra note 3.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)-(5).
8. Id.
9. See generally White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
Startlingly, many have now taken to characterizing rightsholders as "content" owners. This sleight
of hand may cede the strongest grounds for defending against much alleged infringement. As I will
argue, there exists no such notion under current law of "content" owners, but only owners of
enumerated rights to do specific things with works which are defined as much by their
manifestation and purpose as by their abstract content.
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qualify it. Almost a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court crystallized a
highly constrained definition for "copying.'" Early notions of the term (in
copyright contexts) referred only to reconstructing an author's physical
creation so as to serve a like purpose. Although this understanding
informed each subsequent codification-as Congress opted to work around
the construed meaning rather than tinker with it-courts have proceeded
to depart dramatically from this conception. No legislation has redefined
it, and no legislative record indicates any intent to that effect, yet
precedent increasingly holds that any activity involving protected
expression somehow implicates this right. Contemporary case law neglects
the traditional, narrow standard-whether through faulty analyses, efforts
to divine better policy, or both. In this Article, I analyze the history and
codifications of the exclusive reproduction right, urging a more limited
and concrete definition predicated on the original understanding of"copy."
Jurisprudential originalism," a controversial doctrine in constitutional
law, can also function in lower-profile statutory realms to discipline
federal courts 2 to refrain from advancing policies not duly enacted by the
legislative branch.' 3 The balancing of value judgments reflected in our
intellectual property policy is strictly the purview of Congress, and stare
decisis should not be sufficient to propagate any precedent demonstrably
irreconcilable with legislative policy. Though one might surmise that the
legislature could intervene to correct any judicial deviations, the converse
is all the more compelling: Congress is free to revive illegitimate
doctrines-by actually passing them. This default properly allocates the
burden of achieving legislative change. Statutory originalism strives for
that meaning a statute held as of its passage, unshaken by new events and
changing circumstances. For Congress alone can amend what it has
(validly) enacted, no matter how pressing the need or how archaic the
10. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 1. The activity has been expressed over the years using various
legal synonyms: the gerund "copying" in the 1870 statute, the infinitive "to... copy" in 1909, and
the infinitive "to reproduce..." in 1976.
11. 1am advocating a statutory application of originalist jurisprudence (explained in Part II).
For a free-content encyclopedia overview: See Wikipedia, Originalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Originalism. There are different flavors of this judicial philosophy, but most revolve around
the general idea that legal language is capable of meaning which is knowable, preservable, and
binding (rejecting linguistic deconstructionism).
12. Because federal courts are of limited and defined jurisdiction, the case against judicial
lawmaking is arguably stronger there than at the state level, where there have always been courts
of general jurisdiction.
13. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 533 (1983)
(explaining the qualitative distinction between the legislative andjudicial roles). Urging interpretive
restraint, Judge Easterbrook cautions courts against invoking a statute to venture beyond "cases
anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process." Id. at 544.
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status quo. It is through this philosophical lens that I analyze the state of
copyright's fundamental grant.
In 1710, the first codified British copyright law (often called the Statute
of Anne a) prohibited the unauthorized "printing" and "reprinting" of
literary works, and some notion of restricting reproduction has since
remained integral to America's copyright system. As digital media
becomes the dominant means of storing, experiencing, and disseminating
copyrighted materials, Congress and the judiciary increasingly struggle
with a system that mostly developed when these activities took place in the
more conceptually intuitive analog world. 5
The literary-property debates of eighteenth-century England culminated
in 1774 with the House of Lords invalidating any rights in "mental labor"
outside of those that Parliament provided by statute.' 6 Early U.S. case law
settled the constitutional principle that federal copyright protection is
wholly dependent upon congressional dispensation for its existence, scope,
and (finite) duration. 7 Such discretionary grants are often characterized as
14. 8 Anne c. 19 (1710).
15. Evaluating the nature of an analog activity (and comparing such activities) is arguably
a more direct thought process, if not commonsense. The physics and engineering of computer
technology, for example, require more specialized knowledge to comprehend that the more
straightforward operational principles of, say, a printing press or film projector.
16. Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774). This case "overruled" a 1769 King's
Bench ruling in favor of perpetual copyright for authors and assignees. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng.
Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). Interestingly, had Lord Mansfield not recused himself in Donaldson (due
to his prominent role in Millar), the House of Lords would have deadlocked 6-6-failing to
invalidate perpetual copyright! There was strong support (10-2) for the notion that at least some
natural law rights did exist, but were curtailed and supplanted (or at the very least their
enforceability was restricted) by the Statute of Anne.
17. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). This case is often considered the U.S. counterpart
to Donaldson. "it would seem, that if the right of the complainants can be sustained, it must be
sustained under the acts of congress." Id. at 662. The court relies in part on the premise that there
is no federal common law at all, though a stark dissent reasons that this still need not preclude
Pennsylvania (the state in question here) from inheriting the English common law--especially since
that colony had been settled prior to the 1710 statute. Dissenting Justice Thompson cites James
Madison in Federalist No. 43 and Justice Story's Commentaries in urging that state common-law
copyright (not merely a right of first-printing) be entertained. I do not address issues of state-level
copyright (common-law or statutory; temporal or perpetual). Concerning the meaning of copy,
Justice Thompson echoes the majority's assurances from Millar that a recognition of common-law
copyright in no way amounts to monopolizing content-owing partly to the narrowness of "copy!"
He says,
[The dissent in Millar] seems to treat the question, as if the claim was to a mere
idea, not embodied or exhibited in any tangible form or shape. No such pretension
has ever been set up, that I am aware of, by any advocate of the right to literary
property. And this view of it would hardly deserve a serious notice, had it not been
taken by a distinguished judge. Lord Mansfield, in the case of Miller v. Taylor, in
defining the nature of the right of copyright says, 'I use the word copy in the

2006]

COPYRIGHT IN EXILE: RESTORING THE ORIGINAL PARAMETERS OF EXCLUSIVE REPRODUCTION

219

public "bargains" between authors and the state to entice the creation of
new works and ultimately further the "Progress of Science and Useful
Arts.' The considerations which Congress should factor in striking such
bargains constitute an interdisciplinary field of study unto itself, but the
finiteness of the grants (in scope and in duration) leaves the public able to
engage lawfully in any non-monopolized activities as a logical
concomitant to those limits on the owner's exclusive domain. The baseline
starting point is that owners enjoy zero federal protection absent
congressional action. So then, what actions does the reproduction right
encompass? What are its parameters? To suggest that it restricts all use-on
the rationale that anything less would thwart the constitutional allowance
for "exclusive rights"-would be to suggest that the monopolies must
always be of infinite scope, thereby invalidating every enumeration since
1790 when Congress in the first Copyright Act itemized rights to "print,
reprint, publish, and vend."
In this Article, I describe how a sound analysis of precedent-coupled
with proper statutory construction-yields a meaning for reproduction that
is indeed adaptable to many unforeseen practices, but far from boundless.
I proceed chronologically through the history of the reproduction right:
Part II first surveys the relevant tenets of originalism. Part II then traces
the roots of the reproduction right back to a landmark 1908 case in which
the Supreme Court synthesized a robust standard grounded in reason and
history, and also shows how legislation enacted the following year
incorporated this standard. Part III discusses the next (and current)
revision, the Copyright Act of 1976, building on the foundation of Part II
to contend that the essential criteria for copying and reproduction went
unchanged. Developments since 1976 are tracked in Parts IV, V, and
VI-respectively covering the 1980 amendments and their adjudication,
key cases from the 1990s, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) of 1998. The theme throughout is that, despite legislative
technical sense in which that name or term has been used for ages, to signify an
incorporeal right to the sole printing and publishing of something intellectual,
communicated by letters;' and this is the sense in which I understand the term
copyright always to be used, when spoken of as property.
Id. at 673. This principle of concreteness does not appear contradicted by Donaldson, and in
subsequent sections I argue that the U.S. Congress-knowingly or not-has since continued to
perpetuate this very limited legal definition of copy.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has said, "The rights of a patentee
or copyright holder are part of a 'carefully crafted bargain' ...
"Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23,33 (2003) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U. S.141, 150-51 (1989)). This speaks only to federal protections, and not to the existence and
policy of any state-level protections.
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reorganizations, additions, and niche-provisions, Congress has never
actually altered what it means to "copy"--so the Supreme Court's accurate
definition as of 1908 remains binding today.
In the process, I argue that intellectual property bargains implicate
statutory originalist or separation-of-powers concerns as much as any
congressional domain, and that repudiating baseless precedent is itself
precedented for major copyright doctrine. Despite an accumulated line of
cases systematically misconstruing the reach of copyright's namesake
grant, as well as indications of legislative and executive confusion on the
matter, I submit that the propriety of purging erroneous precedent
outweighs any advantage of persisting in such error.

I. ORIGINALISM AND THE INITIAL PARAMETERS OF
EXCLUSIVE REPRODUCTION

Whatever one thinks of originalism in constitutional interpretation, its
application to statutory law derives from the distinct roles allocated among
the diverse branches of government. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that federal legislation becomes implemented only through the process of
bicameralism and presentment.19 That holding defines "legislation" as
changes to legal rights or duties. 20 Taking this at face value, any rulemaking by the administration (promulgating regulations) or courts
(interpreting code) is presumably for the sole purpose of
implementing-not revisiting-public policy set by Congress. 21 Hence, even
if Congress passively approves of a given judicial decree or executive
regulation deviating from legislated policy, it could be no less invalid; our
system of government does not countenance policymakers' escape from
electoral accountability. Moreover, intellectual property's status as a
public "bargain" all the more implicates this democratic process,
epitomizing the role of representative government.
How then should courts go about assigning meaning to dated statutes?
Congress can, of course, be its own lexicographer, and sometimes gives
definitions for its terms rather than leaving them to their common
meanings. In either case, courts should seek the most objectively
reasonable understanding that would have been contemporaneously
induced by the statute's enactment. Justice Scalia offers a standard in both
19. I.N.S.v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
20. Id. at 952-53.
21. Even those not philosophically opposed to judicial lawmaking for gap-filling and other
minor purposes may not favor imposing, outside of the democratic process, broad new burdens on
individual liberty. Also, some may find originalism more acceptable at the statutory level than at
the constitutional level.
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constitutional and statutory interpretation of striving for the "meaning that
its words were understood to bear 23at the time they were promulgated. 22
This is the essence of originalism.
Note that general meanings for words might expand or contract after
they have been codified. For example, the notion of "performing" a work
once contemplated only human audiences jointly experiencing a work in
real time upon the initiative of the "performer," whereas now the concept
may also subsume transmissions that are both inter-machine and recipientdriven.24 The extent to which the public performance right is affected by
this semantic development is another matter, but the illustration is
analogous: adopting those elements of meaning acquired since codification
would allow technological progress-in and of itself-to effect a substantive
change in the law. 25 Ascertaining the interpretation most faithful to the
original understanding of an enacted provision thus presents the legitimate
22. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, A Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,
Speech at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 18, 1996). This prioritization
of the most natural and reasonable understanding over any evidence of "hidden" or otherwise
inconsistent legislative intent-which at most supplements the code-is known as the textualist or
original-meaning version of originalism. (There is some variance among originalists as to the value
and feasibility of using legislative history at all, but general agreement that it ought never negate
or preempt codified language insofar as it is objectively clear on its face.) I am not making the
general case for originalism, but specifically for its application to intellectual property statutes; only
a finite range of activity is plausibly captured by Congress's use of "copy" and later "reproduce."
I do invoke legislative history to bolster and refine objective meaning, but not to contradict it.
23. I do not dwell on the general theories of originalism in this Article; I focus on applying
it to copyright. If further introduction to the judicial philosophy is desired, the references I have
cited should suffice for my purposes here. Legal literature abounds on both sides of this
controversial jurisprudence.
24. Peer-to-peer file-sharing transmissions could possibly be deemed a form of "public
performance." Other services offering a lesser degree of consumer control (e.g., Pandora.com) are
more likely to preserve the defining qualities of the initial conception-though aspects of the
format could not have been anticipated. Congress also added in 1995 Section 106(6), a digital
public performance right in sound-recording works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
25. This would not pose a problem to the extent that certain kinds of changes may actually
be consistent with the original conception. Embodying flexibility in law is both legitimate and
useful, and there are indeed situations where some degree of unforseeable change is itself
contemplated from the outset. For example, I later mention that unforseen new methods of copying
would be accommodated insofar as they were fundamentally duplicative. (Regarding public
performance, innovations like P2P may or may not possess the defining qualities originally
understood to characterize the designated activity.) Hence, there is no problem with copyright
owners enjoying any windfall benefits accruing from unanticipated value gained through their
legitimate monopolies, provided the underlying activity reasonably falls within the qualitative
scope of the enacted grant; people do not stop owning what they owned merely because technology
heightens the demand, but technology itself ought not serve to redefine what is owned. This
illustrates a (somewhat formalistic) difference between a change in the effect of a law and a change
in the law itself.
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possibility of excluding later-accepted meanings (or, including no-longeraccepted meanings). Of course, parties press for interpretations suiting
their interests, and courts may be inclined to address valid policy concerns,
but such factors ought not to override-or even supplement-findings on
legislative policy.
Applying this framework to copyright, I now begin with the 1908
26
player-piano case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.
Though today's reproduction right comes two statutory overhauls after this
Supreme Court decision, its unanimous holding settled a clear standard
defining "copy"-a standard I submit Congress has retained, albeit
promptly and abundantly supplemented with additional rights. The issue
presented in that case was whether making piano rolls, which cause a
player-piano to perform various musical works, implicated the exclusive
right of "copying" such works. 27 The Court ultimately found that piano
rolls fall outside the domain of what could plausibly be characterized as
copies of the copyrighted sheet music. 28 Congress later amended the law
to give copyright owners additional rights to fill the gap, but it did not
revise a court's criteria for evaluating reproduction. This means that if the
Court's reading of "copying" was correct at the time, and if Congress has
preserved it since,29 it should still control. This gives me two principal
objectives: 1) identify this early standard, justifying it under 1908 law, and
2) establish that it has not been substantively altered-at least according to
interpretive methods devoted to following the enacted meaning of
legislation.
A player-piano is a machine that records piano performances by
making perforations in paper rolls, and then it recreates the performances
using those rolls.3" Alternatively, the perforated sheet can be prepared
manually. Composer Adam Geibel wrote two songs, "Little Cotton Dolly"
and "Kentucky Babe," and sold the copyrights to White-Smith Music
Publishing Company, which published the sheet music.3" Apollo
Company, without permission from White-Smith, manufactured piano
rolls of the two songs, prompting an infringement action. The extant
statute granted musical composers the "sole liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending" their

26. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
27. Id. at 8-10.
28. Id. at 17-18.
29. I go on to argue that the definition of"copying" was preserved in 1909 ("copy") and 1976
("reproduce"). 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(a) (1909); 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1976).
30. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 10.
31. Id. at 8-9.
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works.32 The lone issue before the Court was whether the defendant's
activity constituted "copying" for copyright purposes.33
The White-Smith opinion favorably discusses some accumulated
precedent on the matter. The Court in Kennedy v. McTammany had
declined to classify perforated sheets as copies of sheet music, finding that
the former were "not designed to be used for such purposesas sheet music,
nor do they in any sense occupy the samefield.. . Stern v. Rosey had
distinguished between "reproduction... in sound" and legal copying.
We cannot regard the reproduction, through the agency of a
phonograph, ofthe sounds of musical instruments playing the music
composed and published by the appellants, as the copy or
publication of the same within the meaning of the act. The ordinary
signification of the words
"copying," "publishing," etc., cannot be
35
stretched to include it.
The unanimous White-Smith decision, written by Justice Day,
ultimately agrees with and adopts Justice Shepard's qualitative
differentiation (from Stern) between musical compositions and the means
of their auditory reproduction on the basis that piano rolls "neither
substitute the copyrighted sheets of music nor serve any purpose which is
within their scope." The court limits the reach of the exclusive right to
"printing or otherwise multiplying copies of those sheets of music," and
32. Id. at 9 (citing § 4952).
33.
We cannot perceive that the amendment of § 4966... providing a penalty for any
person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical composition
for which a copyright has been obtained, can have the effect of enlarging the
meaning of the previous sections of the act which were not changed by the
amendment. The purpose of the amendment evidently was to put musical
compositions on the footing of dramatic compositions, so as to prohibit their
public performance. There is no complaint in this case of the public performance
of copyrighted music; nor is the question involved whether the manufacturers of
such perforated music rolls when sold for use in public performance might be held
as contributing infringers. This amendment was evidently passed for the specific
purpose referred to, and is entitled to little consideration in construing the meaning
of the terms of the act theretofore in force.
Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 12 (emphasis added) (citing Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 Fed. Rep. 584).
35. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 12 (citing Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562). Even if
phonorecords of sound recordings would have been eligible for protection in their own right (an
issue not raised here, as plaintiff argued it was the sheet music being copied), that is different from
whether a phonorecord can constitute a copy of a printed score.
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not "sounds indicated by or on those sheets" or "any mechanism for the
production of such sounds."36 In justifying his narrow construction, Justice
Day observes, "Throughout the act it is apparent that Congress has dealt
with the concrete, and not with an abstract, right of property in ideas or
mental conceptions."37
In considering the meaning of copy, the White-Smith court starts with
a general definition-not given by statute--of "a reproduction or
duplication of a thing., 38 This may not get one very far, but it does
emphasize that refined sense of reproduction for which "duplication" is
synonymous, versus any conceivable use (e.g., sound in the air).39 Though
the words may seem like alternatives, the conjunction "or" denotes
equivalence.40 So, merely re-expressing the content-in any form, for any
purpose-was not automatically sufficient to qualify as copying where the
activity could not be characterized as duplicative (or multiplicative) of the
36. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (e.g., "conveying... meaning... to the eye"). It is not the
lack of eye-visibility per se that was of concern, but the lack of like usability-which in this
particular case happened to be eye-visibility. Justice Shepard (in Stern) had relied in part on the fact
that most phonorecords convey no meaning "to the eye of even an expert musician." Stem v.
Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562. This comports with the multiplicative quality found inherent in the
concept.
37. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added). The court reasons strongly against reading
any abstract right in creative content into the concrete rights actually granted.
Musical compositions have been the subject ofcopyright protection since... 1831
...and laws have been passed including them since that time. When we turn to
the consideration of the act it seems evident that Congress has dealt with the
tangible thing, a copy of which is required to be filed with the Librarian of
Congress, and wherever the words are used (copy or copies) they seem to refer to
the term in its ordinary sense of indicating reproduction or duplication of the
original. [The statute] provides that two copies of a book, map, chart or musical
composition, etc., shall be delivered at the office of the Librarian of Congress.
Notice of copyright must be inserted in the several copies of every edition
published, if a book, or if a musical composition, etc., upon some visible portion
thereof
Id. at 15-16. Observe how this parallels Lord Mansfield's description of "copy" back in Millar;
Parts III-VI argue that Congress has yet to abandon this model.
38. Id. at 17. "What is meant by a copy? We have already referred to the common
understanding of it as a reproduction or duplication of a thing." Id.
39. This matter was not engaged on minimal-fixation grounds, but on the grounds of what
constitutes a copy. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 17. Had the phrase been designed to espouse a definition of copy (n-or-v) spanning
the conceivable realm of either term separately, that would be irreconcilable with the court's
subsequent colloquial use of "reproduce" in referring to specifically excluded activity (i.e.,
reproduction of sound by mechanical means). Id. The equating with "duplication" serves a limiting
role, as that term holds relatively narrower meaning. Id.
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original.4 Does this actually tighten the standard, or is it just a distinction
without a difference? Justice Day first dispenses with the notion that
(re)producing sound vibrations amounts to copying their written
counterpart. "It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument
which reproduces a tune copies it; but this is a strained and artificial
meaning."4' 2 One must distinguish his loose colloquial use here of
"reproduce" from his higher legal hurdle for "copy," although in their
copyright capacities the terms have long been interchangeable.43
Secondly, the opinion rejects the argument that the physical rolls
themselves constitute copies of the sheets--chiefly on the grounds of how
differently the two objects are experienced." "[E]ven those skilled in the
making of these rolls are unable to read them as musical compositions, as
' "These perforated rolls
those in staff notation are read by the performer."45
are parts of a machine which, when duly applied and properly operated in
connection with the mechanism to which they are adapted, produce
musical tones in harmonious combination. But we cannot think that they
' Interestingly, the
are copies within the meaning of the copyright act."46
opinion concedes in dicta that the reproduction right (even in 1908) can
apply to methods not yet developed, provided the activity still met the
appropriate criterion.47 Hence, the unanimous court's settled meaning for
copying-while not means-specific like "printing"--captures only those
acts tantamount to "duplicating" or "multiplying," the predominant

41. For sheet music then, this would mean "a written or printed record of it in intelligible
notation." Id. at 17. This is not because that is the only way something could be a copy of anything,
but only because that is the only way something could be a copy of sheet music (whose purpose
was deemed to be readable by musicians).
42. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17. "In no sense can musical sounds which reach us through the
sense of hearing be said to be copies [of sheet music]..." Id.
43. "What is meant by a copy? We have already referred to the common understanding of
it as a reproduction or duplication of a thing." Id. I have explained how the "or" equates
reproduction with duplication, and it is fairly straightforward that the "as" equates both of those
with "copy." I therefore treat "copy," "reproduction," and "duplication" as synonymous for both
the processes and objects they denote. It is also interesting that Justice Day implicitly blends his
analysis of "copying" with that of "copy (n)."
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 14. "Any mode of copying [sheet music], whether by printing,
writing, photography, or by some other method not yet invented, would no doubt be copying." Id
(emphasis added). The prospect ofunforeseen technology was not neglected; one cannot accuse this
court of being arbitrarily rigid or tunnel-visioned about the law's capacity to flexibly adapt where
appropriate.
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criterion that centered on a key theme: suitability for like purposes (i.e.,
substitutionary potential).48
In addition, the Court also factors defendant intent. It considers the
purposes toward which the defendant subjectively directed his activity,
along with those that the end product objectively served.4 9 So, a copy need
not only be similarly usable (in this case, eye-readable) by the same users
(here, skilled musicians), but also the result of a process consciously aimed
towards that end. Though the infringement branch of copyright law has
never imposed a separate mens rea element, one must view any
infringement inquiry in terms of the specific exclusive rights implicated;
infringement does not exist in isolation, but only with respect to certain
proscribed actions. ° Many action verbs are inherently qualified; take as an
example the word "repair." It generally connotes activity with purposeful
direction. 1 While Justice Day is not precise as to extent (possibly because
it was not necessary here to look beyond actual suitability), his sense of
copy and copying appears to embody some element of intent to duplicate. 2
Finally, the White-Smith opinion closes by recognizing that its
deliberately unimaginative definition of copy may indeed deprive
copyright owners of certain controls that perhaps they should enjoy, but
48. Id.at 17. I use "purpose-suitability," "substitutability," and "multiplicity" in describing
the White-Smith standard.
49. Id. at 11-18. For example, this is indicated when the court states that the rolls are "not
intended to be read as... sheet music." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). One could respond that the
opinion focuses on objective suitability more than subjective intent, but the court does not dismiss
the latter entirely. Unfortunately, however, this aspect of the court's reasoning is less explicit. But
I would also note the favorably-cited phrasing from Kennedy referring to the purpose for which an
object is "designed," as the word "design" likewise bears a connotation of conscious volition. Id.
at 12 (citing Kennedy v. McTanmany, 33 Fed. Rep. 584).
50. The statute describes infringement as follows: "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided ...is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author,
as the case may be." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000). Infringement is defined expressly in terms of
enumerated exclusive rights. See id.
51. "To restore to a sound or healthy state." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,Repair,
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/repair. Admittedly, this authority is of limited value as
connotations are not intrinsic to an "official" definition--only suggested by common usage.
Nevertheless, it would seem contrived to apply the word to some random, fortuitous restoration
occurring by happenstance. Chasing the point one step further, the definition of "restore" is "to put
or bring back into existence or use. Merriam-WebsterOnline Dictionary,Restore, http://www.mw.com/dictionary/ restore.
52. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18. If still unchanged today-as I go on to argue-it would
quell many issues regarding involuntary "reproduction" (e.g., ISP liability, subconscious copying).
It may also ease some of the murkier factual inquiries into purpose "suitability," and even free
many uses which might otherwise be copying but for an intent-perhaps evidenced by good-faith
efforts-not to substitute them so as to substantially replicate the purpose(s) served by the original
work.
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nonetheless concludes that only Congress can redraw the boundaries
between exclusive and free uses.5 3 This marks an interesting contrast to the
later holding of Kalem Co. v. HarperBros., 4 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court more loosely construes the separate "dramatization" right so as to
include motion pictures." Justice Holmes, the author of that opinion,
offers a restrained concurrence in White-Smith, commenting that a more
just and sensible law would protect all aspects of works constituting their
"essence" or their "meaning and worth. 5 6 But despite such sympathy for
copyright owners, he joins the unanimous decision declining to judicially
stretch "copying" into anything more than it was.57 Frustrated with an
outcome he feels compelled to support, he nonetheless concedes, "The

53. See id. at 18. "[S]uch considerations address themselves to the legislative and not to the
judicial, branch of the government." Id.
54. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
55. Id. at 61.
By Rev. Stat., § 4952, as amended ....
authors have the exclusive right to
dramatize any of their works. So, if the exhibition was or was founded on a
dramatizing of [the work] this copyright was infringed. We are of opinion that [the
work] was dramatized by what was done. Whether we consider the purpose of this
clause of the statute, or the etymological history and present usages of language,
drama may be achieved by action as well as by speech. Action can tell a story,
display all the most vivid relations between men, and depict every kind of human
emotion, without the aid of a word.
Id. Once again, the Supreme Court is quite open to considering novel activity, but only within the
parameters of the original concept; the Court views Congress's provision here as being more elastic
than the reproduction right. Also, courts around that time applied a looser-though not
boundless-standard for alternative "versions" of works such as abridgments. See Ricordi v.
Mason, 201 F. 182 (CCNY 1911), aff'd.210 F. 277 (2d Cir 1912); but see Macmillan Co. v. King,
223 F. 862 (D.C. Mass. 1914). The threshold was not . . . a hair-trigger, but relatively few
derivative abridgments would be excused without authorization.
56. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring). "One would expect the protection
to be coextensive not only with the invention, which, though free to all, only one had the ability to
achieve, but with the possibility of reproducing the result which gives to the invention its meaning
and worth." Id.
57. See id. at 18-19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
In view of the facts and opinions in this country and abroad to which my brother
Day has called attention I do not feel justified in dissenting from the judgment of
the court, but the result is to give to copyright less scope than its rational
significance and the ground on which it is granted seem to me to demand.
Id. at 18-19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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restriction is confined to the specific form, to the collocation
devised
"..,58
Despite ajarring result leaving owners (temporarily)59 without recourse
against auditory reproduction, the Court's reasoning is strong. First, the
fact that courts had recognized "fair use" exemptions from liability long
before these were ever codified reveals inherent limits on what activities
the early statutes had ever monopolized.6" This original understanding
reflected the finite domain of copyright.6' Before fair use was codified in
1976, the term was often employed to refer to non-infringing activity along
with any otherwise infringing ("technically" infringing) uses deemed to be
privileged regardless-typically on various policy grounds courts found
58. Id. at 19 (Homes, J., concurring).
59. Congress soon granted new rights (discussed next) to alleviate this problem. 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 1(e) (1909). With them came the compromise of compulsory licensure, not covered here. Id.
60. In 1841, Justice Story had grappled with when a taking is infringing:
So, in cases of copyright, it is often exceedingly obvious... whereas, in other
cases, the identity of the two works in substance.., often depend[s] upon a nice
balance of the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other... for
example, no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair
and reasonable criticism. On the other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the
most important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the
use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be
deemed in law a piracy. A wide interval might, of course, exist between these two
extremes, calling for great caution and involving great difficulty, where the court
is approaching the dividing middle line which separates the one from the other.
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (emphasis added). He begins with this
general framework, but then later confronts the matter of partial-copying by saying that it can be
enough to infringe if "the labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent
appropriated;" he invokes "the value of the materials taken, and the importance of it to the sale of
the original work" along with the quantity taken. Id. at 348. Nevertheless, I believe the central
theme to be that these various factors (e.g., quantity, importance/vitality, impact on value,
comparative use) serve primarily as aids or tools in evaluating substitutability--or a lack
thereof-which his introduction seems to foreshadow. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519, 520
(1886) (characterizing market impact as a "test" for supercession).
61. Another significant milestone came in 1853, when Judge Grier ruled that a translation of
"Uncle Tom's Cabin" into German was not a copy. "[T]he author's exclusive property in a literary
composition or his copyright, consists only in a right to multiply copies of his book ... and not in
... his conceptions and inventions, which may be termed the essence of his composition..."
Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (emphasis added). A language
translation seems more a derivation (not protected in 1853) than a reproduction, however I think
an abridgment could indeed be a copy (or a "reprinting") as well as a derivation, if there exists
substantial overlap in the purpose(s) to be served-a point I make later regarding "partial copies."
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implicit within the law.6 2 Furthermore, the piecemeal structure of the law
led courts to parse rights with precision and constraint. 63 Going back to
62. There are occasions when otherwise-monopolized uses can be excused, though one could
argue that an "intent" element for certain activity would significantly curtail such a need. Today's
section 107 (fair use) privileges some actual reproduction, derivation; it applies "notwithstanding"
the five rights listed in section 106. I do not detail here the evolution, policies, or codification of
"fair use" theory, but in .he contemporary landmark fair use case of Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court mentions how various
policy considerations do inevitably enter the analysis:
Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a
motion picture . . . A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly
productive. But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal
understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake of
broadening her understanding what her constituents are watching; or a constituent
who copies a news program to help make a decision on how to vote. Making a
copy of a copyrighted work for the convenience of a blind person is expressly
identified by the House Committee Report as an example of fair use...
Id. at 455 n.40. (Of course, I would probably view a braille version as analogous to a language
translation, thus being closer to a derivation than a copy, but the principle of weighing policy merit
is still relevant.) Even the dissent, though drawing the line quite differently, does not dispute that
policy judgments are inherent to fair use analyses. Arguably, the doctrine has been applied in many
respects so as to often roughly match the early standard in ultimate result. Nevertheless, much of
what fair use allows was never actually restricted in the first place, so one cannot assume that but
for a fair use "exception" a given act is otherwise proscribed. This presumption shifts the burden
(if fair use be deemed an affirmative defense) as well as substantively expands the scope of the
monopoly to sweep anything not otherwise privileged! Exclusive rights have always been defined
in the positive, not simply as the inverse of their exceptions.
63. Harper,26 F. at 520.
The statute not only makes provisions for copyright[ing] charts, prints, cuts,
engravings, etc., but makes a distinction between infringement of a book and of
a cut, engraving, etc. A book is infringed by printing, publishing, importing,
selling, or exposing for sale any copy of the book. Section 4964, Rev. St. A chart,
print, cut, engraving, etc., is infringed by engraving, etching, working, copying,
printing, publishing, importing, selling, or exposing for sale a copy of the chart,
cut, etc. Section 4965.
Id. The Harpercourt concludes from this language that "copying without printing or publishing is
infringement only as to [a] cut, chart, print, engraving, etc." Id. This case also illustrates the
commingling often occurring between the issues of substitutability and financial harm: "The law
does not tolerate an appropriation which tends to supersede the original. A test frequently applied
is whether the extracts, as used, are likely to injure the sale of the original work." Id. Note how
there is no problem of circular reasoning in harmonizing these concepts, because the only "harm"
in question here deals with actual sales of the original work, rather than some normative policy
matter of what additional markets owners should dominate. Because printing and copying works
has always been a separate right from vending and distributing such copies, the prospect of lost
sales would seem to be operating here as a metric for assessing supercession, as opposed to vice
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"printing" and "reprinting," the earliest grants were not open-ended
formulations but conspicuously targeted ones. And as no statutory
definition existed for the term "copying" that White-Smith was construing,
the historical legal context in which the word emerged provided the most
reasonable meaning. Hence, copying a musical composition was not a
question of content, but one of substitution-the finctional 64 equivalent of
"printing" for books (i.e., "otherwisemultiplying").
The next year, Congress addressed some inadequacies of the existing
copyright scheme in a comprehensive revision. This 1909 Act restricted
making unauthorized sound recordings--existing in a distinct class of
reproductions called "phonorecords"--of compositions by adding in
section 1(e) an exclusive right "to make any arrangement or setting of it
or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in
which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be
read or reproduced."65 Far from being a repudiation of White-Smith, this
revision followed years of grappling with how to protect composers
against the unauthorized "reproduction of music by mechanical means,"
66
in addition to whatever public-performance rights they might enjoy.
versa (as in many modem fair use analyses). It would indeed beg the question to define "copying"
as harming the market for "copies" of a work; reproduction must first be defined independently,
so it can be established what the copyright owner is getting the right to sell.
64. I do not mean "functional" in the utilitarian sense of having some practical application,
but only with respect to the author's creative purpose(s). Here, the court decided that the
composer's purpose was for musicians to read his works, visually, so that was what had to be
recreated-by printing, or otherwise. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 13
(1908).
65. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e) (1909). The new arrangement right in Section 1(e) was enumerated
separately from the undisturbed right to copy, which was reiterated in the first section, 1(a), along
with the classic rights to print, reprint, publish, and vend (staples going back to 1790). 17 U.S.C.
§ 1(e) (1909). So the reproduction right, though greatly supplemented, was not itself redefined.
Congress left intact the meaning settled by a unanimous Supreme Court the previous year. WhiteSmith, 209 U.S. at 1 (Note again how the unofficial "broad sense" of reproduction can refer even
to something as intangible as the sound waves a device (re)produces. One should not conflate this
connotation with violative "copying;" such vibrations are not even minimally fixed, much less
comparably or substitutably so, as required in White-Smith).
66. The House Report (from the committee on Patents) on the 1909 Act begins with multiple
references to the growing pressure for a major overhaul. "For years men familiar with the copyright
laws of this country have urged the necessity of a complete revision." H.R. Rep. 2222 (Feb. 22,
1909) at 1, reprintedin 6 E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI & ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (F.B. Rothman ed., 1976). "The pressing need of a revision of the copyright
laws was urged by the President in his message to Congress in December, 1905." Id. Specifically,
the report mentions the particular emerging need to address what was being called "reproduction
of music by mechanical means." Id. at 4. "Subsection (e) of section 1 of the bill, which deals with
the reproduction of music by mechanical means has been the subject of more discussion and has
taken more of the time of the committee than any other provision in the bill." Id. "Not only in the
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The House Report from the committee that unanimously approved H.R.
28192 in 1909 confirms that the first subsection merely perpetuates
existing rights along with the case law construing them:
Subsection (a) of section 1 adopts without change the phraseology
of section 4952 of the Revised Statutes, and this, with the insertion
of the word 'copy,' practically adopts the phraseology of the first
copyright act ever passed-that of 1790. Many amendments of this
were suggested, but the committee felt that it was safer to retain
without change the old phraseology which has been so often
construed by the courts.6 7

Also note that any direct sensory-perceptibility requirement-sometimes
a barrier to copyright eligibility (e.g., for piano rolls)-would later be
expressly disclaimed in the next revision of 1976.68

So, the meaning of copy from White-Smith was implicitly affirmed by
the very statute that ironically counteracted that case's result. The 190969
Act actually accommodated the status quo-represented by the correct
1908 holding-by tacking on the 1(e) arrangement and setting right. 70 So,
a plaintiff today need not seek to strain the meaning of copy and reproduce
to assert that his work 'A' is in some sense "reproduced" by making a
United States but in England and nearly all the countries of Europe this question is troubling the
courts and the legislative bodies." Id. at 5. The report also observes that article 13 of the Berne
Convention (to which the United States was not a party) had recommended legislation to grant
authors of musical works an exclusive right to control their reproduction by mechanical means. Id.
at6.
67. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Two years earlier in 1907, when White-Smith was pending
before the Supreme Court, there was some disagreement as to whether Congress should add the
arrangement right of section l(e), since they did not yet know whether piano rolls would be
characterized as copies of compositions. The House Bill from 1907 (H.R. 25133) contained in 1(e)
only the commercial public performance right, an omission which the House Report justified by
noting "should the court hold [for the defendant], Congress can then take up the question of giving
further protection to musical authors, if it deem it wise to do so, in a separate bill." H.R. Rep. 7083
(Jan. 30, 1907) at 9, reprintedin BRYLAwSKI & GOLDMAN, supranote 66. Though the new Act did
not end up getting passed until 1909 anyway, this shows how removed the piano-roll issue was
from 1(a) and the term "copy."
68. Section 102(a) speaks to works requiring the "aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (2000). It had only been a few years earlier that sound recordings-fixed in
phonorecords-became eligible for copyright. See The Sound Recording Amendment, infra note
90, § 3.
69. See generally White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 1. This is important, because Congressional
inaction does not have the power to ratify flawed case law. As I have stated, my first objective was
establishing that the White-Smith doctrine was correct as of its time.
70. This feature of copyright is largely subsumed in today's generalized derivation right of
section 106(2). See 17 U.S.C. 106(2) (2002).
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related work 'B.' Whether or not 'B' requires a machine, it now enjoys
protection in its own right if authored or authorized by the copyright owner
in 'A,' and if not, 'B' might still violate derivation rights in 'A'-provided
in either case that 'B' is both minimally creative and sufficiently fixed.7
(It is notable that, still today, a piano roll is classified as a "phonorecord"
instead of a "copy;" it is telling that Congress avoids any hint of tampering
with the settled understanding of the concept, even while extending it!) So
the actual facts of White-Smith should indeed lead to a different result
now, but not because the legal sense of "reproducing"7 2 was ever expanded
to cover turning sheet music into a sound recording.
Accordingly, White-Smith's definition of copy is still controlled under
the 1909 Act. In Section 1(a), Congress bundled this activity with the
classic rights to print, reprint, publish, and vend-offering no sign of (and
indeed disclaiming) any new standard. The principal criterion was an
object's capacity-and to some extent, design-to create the same user
experience as the author's work. It is noteworthy that Congress preserved
the historical language of "print" and "reprint" in the 1909 revision.73

71. It is debated whether infringing derivative works even need to be fixed, though I later
discuss how the definition of creating any original "work" of authorship (a type of which is the
derivative work, according to section 101) depends upon fixation. It belies the notion of exclusivity
to restrict the public from doing something that the author himself cannot even do (e.g., make an
unfixed derivative "work").
72. Applying the standard from White-Smith, the two are hardly interchangeable. But it would
involve an "arrangement" under the 1909 Act, and a "derivative work" now, if deemed to have
additional originality (i.e., some creative judgment). 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000), 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2000). (A derivative work could also potentially be substitutionary-infringing two separate
rights.) I address the copy-phonorecord distinction in Part Il1.In 1936, Judge Learned Hand seems
to stretch the standard to usage-in-any-similar-context, even if not truly duplicative of the author's
original work. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). He says that
fair and non-infringing use is limited to that which steers clear of uniquely creative "expression."
Of course, this may turn on the question of what the original work's purpose is. If the author's
purpose were construed broadly enough, e.g. to merely have the content be used in any similar
context, then such would indeed satisfy the traditional standard. But aside from parallel independent
creation (in which case each author enjoys his own copyright), the Judge presents the question as
though taking sufficient protectable content is enough by itself to be copying. While I would agree
that no amount ofnon-taken (i.e., new) material necessarily detracts from the potential infringement
of any taken material. Id. at 56. This should not mean that any sufficient taking and merely related
use of the latter automatically amounts to a "copy." For that, it must still be found to actually
duplicate the original work by substituting for the author's purpose (whatever that is found to be).
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § l(a) (1909).
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While their inclusion need not imply mutual exclusivity with "copy,"74 the

redundant verbiage colors the reading; sandwiching the new term within
the 1790 phrasing stresses that "copy" simply extends Justice Day's
"otherwise multiplying" standard so as to establish its blanket applicability
across all protected works-an inference strongly confirmed by the House
Report.
Major supplements to the reproduction right notwithstanding, it is
difficult to maintain that the 1909 Act abrogated the operative "likepurpose" test." In the initial vacuum left by Congress, the White-Smith
court rationally defaulted to a straightforward, traditional definition,
reaching a most sensible conclusion that copying means substituting for
the author's purpose(s) served by his original work. Then, Congress left
intact this meaning in 1909,76 and again in 1976 (as I argue next in Part
I). Moreover, not even the common meaning has appreciably changed
between 1908-09 and 1976. 77 Despite some loose colloquial uses of the
word "copy" in various nonduplicative technical contexts, 78 the term's
74. Ironically, this change broadened the reproduction right somewhat for books, by not
limiting their infringement only to literal "printing," but also adding the more flexible, functionallyequivalent standard of multiplication already in use for musical compositions and other works
enjoying a right in "copying" prior to 1909. Remember that copying was deemed as printing or
otherwise multiplying.
75. One must carefully recognize that substitutability is a distinct inquiry from the notion of
harm to a copyright owner, as the latter presupposes some base line allocation of rights. (It must
first be established to what an owner is legally entitled before it becomes meaningful to speak of
violating it.) As a practical matter, substitutability plays a role now via the often-determinative
"fourth factor" in evaluating fair use under section 107: effect on the plaintiffs market. BMG
Music v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005).
76. Shortly before the 1976 revision, the U.S. Court of Claims addressed the reach of the
1909 Act in a fair use analysis. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (1973).
Contrasting the 1909 work-neutral allocation of exclusive rights in 1(a) from the previous workspecific breakdown discussed in Harper,the opinion observes, "The 1909 Act obliterated any such
distinction in its text. It provides in § 5 a list of all classes of copyrightable subject matter
(including books and periodicals), and says in § 1 that the owner of copyright shall have the
exclusive right 'to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work.' Thus, the 1909 Act,
unlike the earlier statutes, does not expressly say which of the proscribed acts of§ 1 apply to which
classes of copyrightable subject matter of § 5." Id. at 1350. But while allowing that books could
be infringed other than strictly by "printing," the court did note longstanding acceptance of
"photographing" and "photostat," in cautioning "we cannot stop with the dictionary or 'normal'
definition of 'copy'-nor can we extract much affirmative help from the surfacial legislative text."
Id. However, I have contended that the 1(a) wording did suggest constraint by stringing "copy"
within the 1790 verbiage, and the 1909 Act's legislative history only reinforces this.
77. As argued earlier, changes in "everyday" meaning ought not control to whatever extent
transpiring post-codification, but the case for an expansive meaning is only weakened by its poor
linguistic support.
78. Purely functional and facilitative data reiteration or storage falling short of an
operationally-independent multiplication (i.e., a viable substitute) of a digital work, e.g., memory
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general sense remains fairly exacting-typically equated with such terms
as "imitation" or "reconstruction."" This is not to suggest some absurdly
absolute molecule-by-molecule requirement offering no realistic
protection, but the standard employed by the Supreme Court-and left in
place by Congress-was more exacting than blanket usage or reexpression. Of course, courts do have to decide how closely an object must
parallel each original's purpose(s) to be found substantially substitutable
(i.e., infringing), as well as how broadly to identify such purpose(s) in the
first place.8"
Thus far, I have established what it meant to copy before the 1909 Act,
along with the fact that the Act only entrenched this meaning. While the
new statute did apply an exclusive reproduction right to more things, and
also added new protections perhaps overdue, neither the text nor the
legislative history support departing from the reproductive standard
identified in White-Smith. This means that going into the next revision of
1976, "to copy" was to substantially substitute-or multiply-the tangible
object constituting an author's original work, serving a substantially
similar purpose as the same. Next, I discuss the 1976 Act governing today,
demonstrating that this standard has yet to be disturbed (at least under
objective-meaning originalism).
II. THE CURRENT REPRODUCTION RIGHT

The latest incarnation of the reproduction right is section 106(1) of the
Copyright Act of 1976, giving each copyright owner the exclusive right

buffering, caching.
79. Merriam-Webster Online Thesaurus, Copy, http://www.m-w.com.
80. The latter could be viewed as roughly analogous to "claim construction" in patent law.
As a hypothetical extreme, any copyrightable work could have a "purpose" of making the world
a better place, but such platitudes hardly make for a helpful standard. Had the White-Smith court
defined the purpose of sheet music to be simply for people to hear its notes be played, instead of
to be visually understood and performable by human musicians, then it probably would have been
easier to show infringement. Recall Justice Shepard's notion of serving some purpose within the
original work's "scope." Note the key role here of an intent element for creation: if courts are
guided by the subjective intent of authors, they need not themselves render judgment as to what
creative purpose(s) a work of authorship could "reasonably" serve. On the other hand, if courts will
not inquire into the actual intent behind an author's work, they must then attempt to "objectively"
assess the creative purpose(s) served by each given work. As I submit in Part III, the standards for
intent should equate between an original work of authorship and copies thereof, based upon the
respective definitions of each.
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"to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords."'' So what
is the modem significance of this phrase? Professor Stem suggests, "[t]he
verb 'reproduce' and noun 'copy,' individually or in combination, are not
so self-defining and so full of intrinsic content that it is a simple task to
discern from studying them as words what policies the copyright law
embodies in defining infringement (and its correlative, owners' rights)."82
While this may be true, I aim to show that nothing within the 1976 Act
operates to affirmatively alter the previously settled and ratified standard.
That is, "reproduce

. .

." mirrors the 1909 activity referenced by "copy,"

which in turn reiterated the 1870 articulation "copying" which the U.S.
Supreme Court had narrowly construed to require like-purpose suitability
by design. 83 Accordingly, this standard was still in force afterwards.
Congress has never defined the act of reproducing-given formerly by
"copy" (v.) and now by the operative verb "reproduce." Congress did,
however, give definitions for the qualifying nouns "copies" and
"phonorecords" in section 101 (analyzed shortly).84 Each reproductive
manifestation necessarily falls into one of these two object classes.
Reading the function and outputs together, they appear to reiterate the
settled understanding of the former right "to... copy," albeit denoted with
alternative phrasing (i.e., "to reproduce . . . in copies") to facilitate
extending the concept to non-visually-perceived material (i.e., ". . . and

phonorecords").8 1 Provided the now-codified definition for either object
class does not itself affect the definition of the proscribed activity, the new6
phrasing would simply apply the traditional standard to newly protected
sound recordings along with everything else.
Consider copy (n.)-Section 101 defines copies as "material objects
. . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be

perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated."

7

The definition

81. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). Section 106 provides the current exhaustive list of exclusive
rights granted.
82. Richard H. Stem, Cases and Materials, available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/
claw/ch3a.htm.
83. See generally White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). Each of the five exclusive rights provided by section 106 is
structured with an infinitive verb followed by its direct object (e.g., "to reproduce the copyrighted
work," "to prepare derivative works," "to distribute copies"), then modified by one or more
prepositional phrases (e.g., "in copies," "based upon the copyrighted work," "of the copyrighted
work").
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
86. A reproduction right had only been granted for sound recordings as of 1971. The Sound
Recording Amendment, P.L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). As in 1908-09, the loose colloquial sense of "reproduce"
appears again to describe what a copy itself does, rather than the process of its own coming into
existence. Also, the definition expressly permits the "aid of a machine or device," so as to
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(mutually) excludes phonorecords, which are defined similarly except that
they fix "sounds," whereas copies fix any work other than a sound
recording. The open-ended latter language-allowing a work to be
communicated in any way-might seem to imply that any expression of
a work's content would qualify. But one must also examine what
constitutes the "work" that must be both "[re-]fixed" and "communicated"
(separate requirements).88 Both works and copies thereof are defined in
terms of fixation, a concept requiring copies as well as eligible original
works (which are presumably subject to the same minimal-fixation
standard)89 to exist in some particular kind of usable, physical form.9" Lest
this statutory9 linchpin of copyright be relegated to a mere procedural
hurdle, one must-consistent with the White-Smith approach--consider it
intrinsic to the work itself. The 1976 Act grants protection to "works of
authorship" irrespective of format, instead of focusing on particular forms
of media (some of which are rather interchangeable). 92 However, this in no
way mitigates the innately-and legally-commingled role of inspiration's
physical manifestation in comprising each work: whether an author
chooses paper, piano roll, film, clay, or ice and whether he makes it large
encompass duplications of those works which themselves get experienced indirectly (e.g. films can
be eligible works, so copies of them are "copies.") 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
88. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Note too that the definition ofphonorecords likewise permits any
means of communication for the fixed sounds, yet this does not mean that communicating
something other than those actual recorded sounds could plausibly qualify. The particular sounds
themselves are what must ultimately be communicated somehow, not merely their underlying
content. For example, a machine or device displaying the content of sound via some graphical
representation would implicate not just the means of communication, but the kind and quality of
work being communicated. (The means-neutral, format-neutral theme of the 1976 Act does not
loosen the standard for judging reproduction; indeed, it elevates the importance of this limiting
principle.) Conversely, fixed sounds are only "reproductions" of other fixed sounds. It is perfectly
consistent to say that the "sound recording" is what the law protects rather than just the
"phonorecord," because many different kinds of phonorecords could interchangeably or
substitutably fix the same sounds. Analogously, the law protects movies or audiovisual works rather
than DVDs, and software rather than disks.)
89. The definition of "copies" invokes the term "fixed," which is defined only once (in close
proximity). 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). However, fixation is defined with reference to a "tangible
medium of expression," which is not defined. Merriam-Webster offers a current definition of
"medium" as "a mode of artistic expression or communication," and then one for "mode" as "a
manifestation, form, or arrangement of being." See supranote 51.
90. Fixation affects the meaning of both work and copy(n)--remember Justice Day's (and
Lord Mansfield's) elevation of the "concrete" over the "abstract." It comes into play in two areas:
1)the minimum threshold for any work to exist (and thus also the de facto minimum threshold for
any copy to possibly exist), and 2) defining each individual work's legally-recognized status-that
which a "copy" must repeat.
91. I avoid here any constitutional issues regarding the definition of "writings."
92. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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or small, robust or delicate, stationary or mobile. Some works are suited
for visual consumption, others for auditory, others for both; some to be
enjoyed individually, others collectively; some perpetually repeatable ondemand, others for a more fleeting experience. In any event, it is the nature
and quality of the human sensory93 experience ultimately sought by the
author's fixation that a copy needs to recreate.
Each newly "created" work is defined into legal existence by its first
fixation;94 thus, fixation is not merely a ratification step en route to
protecting an author's thoughts. Any single work-as opposed to a
different, alternatively fixed work is not multiplied by a work of a different
nature expressing the same underlying content (e.g., phonorecords of
sounds relating to works that were initially fixed inaudibly for visual
perception).95 Though this might seem to involve a question of
"usefulness," the reality is that some fixations-going back to the analysis
in White-Smith-are only suitable for certain uses; one should distinguish
using a work to experience it from using it for some practical application.
Copies thus must be fixed, and thus usable, however similar to the
original is necessary to substantially constitute the same work. So fixation
for a copy is, in effect, more particularized than for a new work-but only
by virtue of the fact that there is a finite set of already-created and fixed
works of which copies could be made, in contrast to the boundless realm
of potential new fixations. Additionally, insofar as an author's intent is
integral to his new work, this strengthens the case that a copyist's intent
is likewise integral to any reconstruction, meaning that the sensory
experiences from both objects must be by design.
Furthermore, merely validating that all communicative modes are
acceptable (also true of new works)96 in no way mitigates the distinct
requirement that the work be (re)fixed. A work's-thus also a
copy's-tangible nature remains paramount: by equating creation with
fixation rather than conception, the statute defines works not in terms of
93. I later address the related problem of extending copyright protection to those works never
perceived by human senses; whether legally valid or not, such a severe departure from copyright
tradition does radically expand the realm of eligible works, although there is no reason why my
standard of purpose-suitability could not still be applied to those items as well. Multiplying a
work's functionality need be assessed with no less scrutiny than multiplying a work's aesthetic
value.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002). The section 101 definition of how a work first gets created
relies entirely upon the principle of fixation.
95. Such things might prove to be derivative works, but they should not be restricted on
106(1) grounds. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
96. This does serve to maximize copyrightability however-almost any creative fixation can
now be a work, eligible for the protections of section 106. But one still has to actually copy it in
order to violate 106(l). See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1) (2000).
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their ethereal significance, but rather by their realized material incarnation.
Recall the White-Smith formulation of reproducing "a thing," not "a
concept."
Further, section 101 applies the term "copies" even to the object
embodying an author's original work, further equating the two thresholds
of minimal-fixation while at the same time particularizing each copy's
definition to its original. That is, the original is just another (albeit the
first) copy, implying interchangeability (substitutability) with nonoriginals. The definition of creating a work even speaks of fixing it "in a
copy," supporting the additional inference that even the noun bears an
intent element reflecting the author's own creative purpose(s).97 Also
observe that "the copyrighted work" is the direct object of "reproduce" in
section 106(1). The same logic applies; it is not a right to reproduce "any
variation of the work-derivative or otherwise,"98 but a right to reproduce
"the copyrighted work." A copy is not an object fixing "any work which
involves the copyrighted work's protectable expression,"99 but only an
object in which "the work" is fixed. In sum, the infinite domains for
communicative means and fixation methods (for copies as well as
originals) are qualified by what it is that is being fixed and
communicated-namely, the original work, defined in meaningful part by
the experiential uses for which the author had first fixed it.
As with section 1(a) of the 1909 Act, the scope of the reproduction
right was again expanded only in the sense of protecting more things, not
in the sense of being evaluated any differently. "[C]opies or phonorecords"

97. This does assume courts would at least look to the intent of the author; otherwise, as I
noted earlier, courts must decide what "objective" creative purpose(s) a work could "reasonably"
serve. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 1. These two inferences from section 10 [-equating standards
of both fixation and intent between originals and copies-could be countered by positing that the
statutory references to new works involve mere subsets of what "copy"(n.) could mean (i.e., more
stringent tests for fixation and intent), whereas for reproduced works they span the "full" meaning.
But this proposition seems backwards if one accepts the preceding argument that all copies are
defined strictly in terms of their respective tangible originals.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). It only qualifies as a "derivative work" if additional creative
judgments are contributed. (A derivative work is a kind of original work of authorship.) But if an
item is neither a copy nor a derivative work, then it would not violate any of the exclusive rights,
because those are the only two rights about making objects. So, items avoiding any restriction
would be those which both 1) lack any common creative purpose with the original, and 2) lack
creative additions. I do not analyze in this Article the standard for what constitutes "preparing a
derivative work" under section 106(2), but minimal creativity is needed for any kind of work.
99. The idea-expression dichotomy (Baker)doctrine should not be confused to imply that just
because certain content is protectable, that it is protected against all use. As with Sheldon, one
should still have to actually duplicate the author's work sufficient to be substitutable for the
author's original purpose (whatever that is deemed to be in a given case).
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are simply the complete range of all reproductive output;'° still, making
a phonorecord would only be reproductive with respect to a phonorecord.
To believe that section 106(1) prohibits making a phonorecord of even a
non-phonorecord, one would need to believe that Congress subtly
eradicated the like-purpose standard of its operative verb through its use
of a noun whose very existence seems designed in large part to avoid
disturbing any established meanings. If copy (n.) and phonorecord are
mutually exclusive, as mentioned earlier, and if an author's initial
fixation--other than a phonorecord-is itself termed a copy, a distributive
reading would then yield the untenable equivalent, "to reproduce the [first
copy] in . . . [additional] copies and [non-copies]!" (If using X to make
something mutually exclusive with X is now reproduction and copying,
then the activity's definition has lost all boundaries.) With this
understanding of works and their copies as distinctly fixed material
objects, I proceed to analyze the activity implicated by section 106(1).
How closely must a given object resemble some work's initial fixation
in order to constitute a (re)fixation of it?' ° ' At what point is it "the [same]
work?" One does not find this information in the statute (express or
implied), so one properly reverts to the traditional standard: whatever
duplicates the creative purpose(s) of the author's fixation. At the margins,
this inquiry can be heavily fact sensitive (e.g., books on tape, television
interview transcripts, similar songs, °2 music samples,'03 photographs of 2100. Subsections 106(1)-(3) use the plural forms of the nouns "copies," "phonorecords," and
"works," and yet there is general agreement that reproducing, deriving, or distributing is prohibited
even if done only once. Such abstract usage of count-nouns reinforces a primary emphasis on the
activities delineated by the series of operative infinitive verbs. See 17 U.S.C. 106 (2000). In the
case of "reproduce," the still undefined concept appears unchanged by the noun "copies," whose
definition is particularized to respective original works.
101. This inquiry overlaps the issue of infringement, which typically employs a "substantial
similarity" test, of which there are multiple variations. I accept this as a general standard for
infringement-but my focus here is on what must be "substantially simulated" to specifically
infringe the reproduction right. Beware that thinking of infringement (or wrongful appropriation,
for that matter) in a vacuum would, in effect, lead to a generalized content-use right. A narrow
sense of copy and copying effectively serves to absorb many murky idea-expression analyses,
which stop at which content is protected-not asking what it is protected against.
102. Instead of deciding whether two given songs are "substantially similar" in some nebulous
sense, pose the somewhat more exacting (though still unavoidably subjective) question of whether
experiencing the defendant's song substantially substitutes for experiencing the plaintiff's-not
because substitutability is just a handy proxy for likely economic harm, as in a fair use analysis, but
because it is the foundational legal criterion for "copy." If not, the plaintiff would be left to argue
that it is alternatively a derivative work. The extent to which music can "influence" each other
before implicating derivation is another matter.
103. The sixth circuit recently held all digital sampling-however short-to be infringing,
subject only to the (often unpredictable) fair use defense. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). The circuit court apparently inferred a special "sampling right"
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D artwork, and perhaps even objective duplicates confined strictly to
nonsubstitutionary usel°4). Nevertheless, some objects clearly make
reasonable substitutes, even if only for a subset" 5 of purposes (e.g., tapes
or audio files made from CDs, quality artwork replicas, songs downloaded
to a computer hard drive, photocopies, or visual files scanned from books),
while others clearly do not (e.g., written descriptions of nonverbal art,
movie scripts, low resolution thumbnail graphics,"0 6 films and 'ideos
capturing incidental music or artwork, some transformational uses,
functional, or facilitative digital memory). This fact-driven analysis lies at
the heart of "reproducing in copies" today as much as it did in 1908.
In applying a decades-old statute to unforeseen technologies,
analogizing new activities to their preexisting counterparts can sometimes
help to identify which ones fall within the originally understood reach of
a dated provision. For example, digital photocopying works differently
from analog,'0 7 yet both processes operate within the 1976 conception of
copying, as both are directed (objectively and subjectively) towards
multiplying sheets of paper for comparable usability. The same cannot be
said, for example, of the ephemeral data generated incident to the process
for sound recordings that effectively enjoy an even tougher infringement standard than the actual
explicit rights! Id.
104. This depends on whether some threshold element of intent is deemed to have been
preserved in the reproduction right. As mentioned, motives do now come into play via the "fourth
factor" (effect on plaintiff' market) of a fair use analysis-bcause even perfect "copies" made truly
for purposes such as index-building or temporary sampling would indeed inflict less harm on the
copyright owner's market. Alternatively, it could simply be recognized as nonsubstitutionary and
thus nonduplicative, falling outside of section 106(1) altogether. See 17 U.S.C. 106(1) (2002).
Section 107 (fair use) can only affect activities which are monopolized by section 106 in the first
place. Because there is no "indexing right," "sampling right," or "content-expression right," such
rights only exist (and thus fair use only matters) to whatever extent they may be intrinsic to those
actually imparted (e.g. reproduction, distribution, public performance). See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
105. My understanding is that any substantial overlap in purpose or experiential use could
plausibly support a finding of substantially similar purpose-suitability. In other words, a partial
substitute may be enough. This relates to the issue of partial copies, because a partial copy could
at most be a partial substitute.
106. There may actually be times where some margin of substitutability could be argued for
this; for example, when the thumbnail graphics are used not only for practical things like indexing
and previewing, but also for small displays (e.g., cell phones). In Perfect 10 v. Google, 416 F. Supp.
2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006), the district court finds such uses consumptive and superseding in rejecting
a fair use defense. Note that mere pixel-reduction probably lacks the added originality to be a
derivative work, so unless the substitutability threshold is met, there may be no recourse under
section 106. Whether by design or default, there will always be gaps in any piecemeal enumeration
of exclusive rights; to seek exclusive control over all usage would be to invalidate the very notion
of itemized exclusive rights. By that rationale, 106 would either have to be read holistically or
struck down.
107. See Wikipedia, Photocopying,available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photocopier.
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of viewing a web site. By applying protection to copies made via "any
method now known or later developed,"'' 0 8 the statute covers any
functionally comparable reproductive processes-but recall that even the
White-Smith court had no quarrel with novel methods. This principle in no
way widens the meaning of the activity or its tangible product. For
instance, inherent to experiencing many works in the electronic age is
voluminous utilitarian data replication;'0 9 such facilitative activity is hardly
duplicative of a work's ultimate purpose. Unlike digital photocopying, this
does not even parallel any earlier-contemplated practice; rather, it is
necessary to simply use many works. 10 Operational data replication is not
some new method of reproducing a work-it is a method or means of a
given work's operation.
Something else worth mentioning is the classic copyright doctrine of
the idea-expression dichotomy; this has in some ways limited the reach of
the reproduction right."' Baker v. Selden 1 2 established that taking only
those elements which are constitutionally and statutorily unprotectable
(i.e., "ideas") does not constitute violative reproduction." 3 Such caps on
protectability are entirely consistent with the narrowness of the right's
original conception, as even a partial copy of a work must substantially
substitute for some identifiable portion of a work's protectable aspects in
order to meet the early standard. For example, section 102(b) precludes a
copyright in a picture from imparting an exclusive right to make use of any
objects depicted within the picture. 114 While the statute stipulates that the
108. From the definition of "copies," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000), necessarily mirroring the ways
original works may be fixed so as to ensure coverage for any work.
109. See Wikipedia, Random Access Memory, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Randomaccess_memory. The statute expressly disclaims protection for a work's "method of
operation." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). This is in perfect harmony with my advocated standard: a
method of operation is wholly instrumental to-rather than duplicative of-the ultimate human
experience(s) contemplated by the author.
110. I do not take a position here on whether there should be a "use right," just that there is
not one now. I do not delve into the normative policy issues, like whether it would thwart or
advance some purported overarching purpose of copyright law (e.g., protecting property owners;
serving the public; promoting science and art).
111. Although as I noted with respect to Sheldon, this analysis of protectability is a separate
one from whether copying occurred by a given taking.
112. 101U.S. 99(1879).
113. Id. at 106. Interestingly, the more restrictive like-purpose standard could ease the
nebulous task of applying the merger doctrine, by mooting the issue with respect to subduplicative
uses. Of course, in many instances this may just shift the $64,000 question to the separate issue of
derivation, under 106(2).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990). This was only intended to reinforce the classic dichotomy.
H.R. Rep., at 57. S.Rep., at 54. This is another example of how merely making certain exemptions
explicit in no way implies a presumption of liability otherwise.
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picture's copyright does not "extend" to its depicted objects, this also
reflects the White-Smith standard, which regards taking content for use in
a different context as simply nonreproductive. The doctrine is in harmony
with the like-purpose standard.
At this point, I have laid out the history of the reproduction right from
its initial encapsulation by a unanimous Supreme Court in 1908 continuing
through its respective subsequent codifications in 1909 and 1976.15 While
both statutes restructured it with expanded applicability, granting it to
additional classes of works, neither one redefined it or expanded the types
of activities it covers. The historical standard of substitutability for
reproduce and copy thus persists through the 1976 revision. But as I go on
to discuss, many courts have not been adhering to this.
Also consider thejurisprudential implications of a drifting reproduction
right. Though Congress might well have the power to opt for some looser
sense of reproduction flatly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court, it has
never (yet) done so. Still, precedent has proceeded to stretch the meaning
of "reproduce" far beyond anything conveyed by the 1909 (Part II) or 1976
(Part III) statutes. As a non-technological example of such departures, the
second circuit upheld a finding of unauthorized copying against the
publisher of a trivia game-book called the "Seinfeld Aptitude Test" based
upon the television series "Seinfeld." 1 6 This lowering of the bar has been
especially rampant in modem digital contexts-and evidently not pursuant
to any legislative intervention.
Bear in mind the statutory originalist framework: Insofar as judicial
usurpation of the lawmaking process is thought to thwart democratic
accountability, this would seem most problematic for legislation conceived
as a "bargain" on behalf of the public," 7 as all (federal) intellectual
115. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(a) (1909); 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1976).
116. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
Undeniably, creative expression was taken and used in substantial quantity, but to what end?
Arguably a derivative work, but clearly not a "copy." Again, infringement is only meaningful in
the context of enumerated rights. Establishing a taking is not enough; yes, the creative expression
is protected, but only against certain uses. Nevertheless, this court only looks to whether the content
is similar! The [defendant's work] easily passes the threshold of substantial similarity between the
contents of the secondary work and the protected expression in the original. Id. at 141. The circuit
court cited a prior case, in which it had similarly held that still photographs of a ballet could
infringe the underlying choreographic work-directly rejecting a requirement that a copy must
"recreate" the original. Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1986).
117. To the extent that such a bargain could be thought of as a "public contract," it is
noteworthy that the common law of contracts elevates objective over subjective understandings.
See Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). (This case is a fixture of many law
school Contracts casebooks.) This is not to diminish the value of legislative history-which under
my originalist approach can refine and bolster enacted text without contradicting it-but it
strengthens the argument for using reasonable meaning in IP.
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property is in the United States." 8 Congress could ordain new rights
specifying additional uses it may wish to restrict, or perhaps even redefine
the reproduction right-but absent either, courts should not infuse into the
latter an omnibus "right to use expressive content in any way." At the very
least, the burden should reside with proponents of the expansive
redefinition to demonstrate that a reasonable person in 1976 would have
read "to reproduce ...in copies" to really mean "to express or utilize...
in any fixed form." Unless or until Congress votes for a new "content
(re)expression right," the judiciary ought not to unilaterally impose such
a drastic measure. And while one could invoke stare decisis in favor of
perpetuating judicial misconstruction of the reproduction right, there is
indeed Supreme Court precedent for overruling longstanding but erroneous
copyright case law." 9 While such separation-of-powers arguments are
typical in originalism (particularly at the statutory level), it seems an
especially appropriate consideration in IP, where Congress is essentially
a designated go-between for cutting a deal. The Constitution does not
appear to contemplate that society's "bargain" strikers would be the
unanswerable courts.
Next, I proceed to chronicle events in copyright taking place under this
present system (post- 1976), continuing in my theme that nothing has yet
legitimately altered what it means to "reproduce [a] copyrighted
work... 5120

118. As mentioned, the constitutional framers adopted the earlier-referenced Donaldson
approach to copyright (at least at the federal level-I do not here address issues of preemption or
state-law copyright), which in 1774 overturned (or at least counteracted) Millar,which had held
that authors enjoy perpetual exclusive rights under natural law-notwithstanding the expiration of
any statutory rights such as from the Statute of Anne, which had been argued to merely augment
the common law. Perhaps Congress could entertain mixed motives including sympathy to naturallaw rights, but statutory originalism bars federal courts from independently considering such
factors.
119. Courts used to apply an unacceptably forgiving standard for originality, called the "Sweat
of the Brow Doctrine," out of sympathy to those who work hard to compile uncreative works like
telephone directories. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Apart
from the issue of whether the 1976 Act would have even been constitutional if it had relaxed the
"creativity" element, the absence of any new statutory definition for "original" works of authorship
was held to imply a continuation of the prior standard (deemed implicit in the 1909 Act). Lowercourt decisions straying from this test-under either statute-were repudiated without regard to
their age, prominence, or policy appeal.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
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IV. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MODERN SCHEME
This section first addresses an issue that plagued copyright law in the
late 1970s-protecting computer software. I do question the extent to
which copyright was ever even granted in such works, contending that the
true range of software covered by copyright is more limited than certain
cases reflect. But in any event, the substitutability standard for
reproduction right itself goes unaffected, despite judicial
misunderstandings to the contrary.
In 1980, Congress adopted the Commission on New Technological
Uses (CONTU) majority report's recommendations, once again widening
copyright's subject-matter eligibility.'12 While now expressly protecting
computer programs, 22 it was not evident at first that this also extended to
object code (binary machine language). A couple of cases from the 1980s,
FranklinComputer Corp.v. Apple Computer,Inc. 23 and Apple Computer
Inc. v. FormulaInternational,Inc., 24 overturned a longstanding principle
that copyright is only for works that ultimately get conveyed to human
beings. 125 Consequently, software was held protectable regardless of
whether its creative expression is ever perceived by humans, directly or
indirectly. 126 However, there was significant debate among some CONTU
commissioners (particularly in Commissioner Hersey's dissent, with which
Commissioner Nimmer's concurrence partly sympathized) as to both the
constitutionality and the wisdom of granting copyright to communications
which are not ultimately directed toward the human mind or senses.
It is far from conclusive that this was really the effect of either the 1976
or 1980 legislation. While section 102(a) permits eligible works to be
experienced "directly or with the aid of a machine or device," this appears
to presume that the ultimate destination will be the same (i.e., human
perception) in either case.127 (This would seem, in principle, applicable to
source code and object code alike, 12 but source code can more easily
121. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 107 (2006).
122. Computer programs were added to the section 101 definition of "literary works," subject
to two express user privileges in section 117 ensuring "owners" a right to back-up, as well as to
take any "essential step" in utilizing the program. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 107.
123. Franklin Computer Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
124. Apple Computer Corp. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. Id. at 523-24.
126. Id.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
128. See Wikipedia, Object File, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ObjectCode;
Wikipedia, Source Code, availableat http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SourceCode. Object code is
binary machine language (bits of Isand Os); source code is what programmers first compose, in
one of several programming languages, which then gets converted-through compilation or
interpretation-to binary, for computer implementation.
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satisfy the standard because, at the very least, it is understood by fellow
programmers.) Hence, if works (and thus copies thereof) were formerly
expected to at some point be experienced by humans, then section 102(a)
would not change that.
The courts in Franklinand Formula cited a need to give meaningful
effect to the 1980 amendment's definition of "computer program" which
allows instruction3 (code) to be used "directly or indirectly" to yield a
specified result. 2 9 But all that proves is that all software enjoys the
preemptive safe-harbors of section 117, privileging both archival and
"essential steps" of operation. 3 ° It does not follow from this that every
such program must automatically be recognized as a copyright eligible
work-much less a copy of one-if other criteria (e.g., ultimate human
consumption) are not met as well. Inferring this from the definition of a
class of prospective works makes the dubious leap of claiming that
because computer programs-or aspects of them-could potentially
receive copyright protection, that they always will. Depending on how
broadly these terms were construed, this approach could have pervasive
implications for various utilitarian articles incorporating digitally actuated
features. 13 '
Why do I explore subject-matter eligibility in analyzing the
reproduction right? Because many 106(1) infringement disputes arise over
software, aspects of which may not even be statutorily'3 2 entitled to
copyright protection at all. So at least to that extent, an arguably
illegitimate reproduction right has been extended via judicial expansion of
copyright eligibility to a realm where Congress has never actually
gone-namely, those computer programs whose creative aspects are never
perceived by humans. Granted, the consequences of rectifying such an
129. Apple Computer, 725 F.2d at 525.
130. See National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report 1 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU Report], http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/contul.htm.
The CONTU report describes the exclusions to be provided in section 117 as ensuring that those
"in rightful possession of copies of computer programs [are] able to use them freely..." Once
again, one can see the implications of reading a presumption of liability into a safe-harbor
provision. Id.
131. Conceivably, anything with electronic components involving some form of digital
"instructions" is susceptible to this line of thinking. While there is no doubt as to the ingenuity and
creativity involved in designing such products, it is questionable that Congress actually overturned
a longstanding eligibility requirement in order to grant all of them copyright. Although, many could
fit the patent regime, given the different approaches to IP for "authors" (copyright) vs. "inventors"
(patent).
132. It would probably be constitutional to do so, however, because few would claim that
Congress could not protect all software somehow (e.g., a patent or sui genris regime), and there is
no requirement that the various IP systems be neatly classified into mutually-exclusive categories
making maximum sense.
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error after decades of commercial reliance could prove disruptive, but such
pragmatic considerations would not predominate in an originalist approach
(and unlike with constitutional law, Congress could quickly revive the
status quo-properly). While repudiating this error would likely only shift
the relevant policy decisions to other branches of IP law (perhaps under
the patent umbrella), much use of copyright for software has always been
a force-fit (at best) anyway.'33
Aside from the eligibility issue concerning both source code as well as
object code, the latter has curiously been characterized as a copy of the
former. (This notion disturbingly resembles a claim that "compiled" piano
rolls--embodiments of a primitive machine language-are "copies" of
their corresponding sheet music.134) Doubtless it is a use-and a crucial
one. But as source code cannot be implemented (for computer operation)
without first being compiled and interpreted into machine language,
characterizing this operative utilization as copying seems quite a
contrivance. 135 Because indirectness of execution is no bar to copyright
eligibility, compilers are permissible intermediaries which ought not
threaten eligibility for software's protectable aspects. But, taking such a
step cannot constitute reproduction where it produces no viable substitute
or duplicate.1 36 Hence, whether or not a given program is or should be
copyrightable, the standard for what constitutes reproducing it was not
disturbed by the 1980 amendments.

133. Not only could Congress quickly counteract any correction if the perceived need was
sufficiently great, it might even be an opportunity to reconsider which IP system is appropriate for
those computer programs (or elements thereof) whose creative aspects neither directly nor
indirectly reach human senses.
134. While sheet music's direct uses are more widespread than those of source code, neither
bears similar purpose-suitability to its corresponding compiled form. Object code can no more
easily be understood by skilled programmers than can piano rolls by skilled musicians, nor is it any
more readily substituted for its non-compiled counterpart. Of course, if either were deemed to
involve additional creative judgment, as many human language translations arguably do, it could
be a derivative work-whether authorized or infringing.
135. This is true even without the "essential step" exemption in section 117, based simply on
the lack of suitability for like purposes-a fact never more evident than when the purposes are
mutually exclusive! Also remember that 117 applies only to operating "computers," not any other
electronics. Moreover, as noted earlier, the law expressly confirms non-protection for methods of
operation-which compilation is. See 17 U.S.C. § 117.
136. This is a fact-sensitive inquiry, as compiling a single program multiple times could
potentially be partially multiplicative if used simultaneously; this could raise issues of the
programmer's purpose (and also licensure, which I do not address).
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V. APPROACHING THE DMCA

A couple of cases from the 1990s (before the DMCA) set the stage for
later developments. The first was MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc. 37
1 which espouses a markedly expanded reproduction right. MAIis the
landmark case holding that data replication in RAM constitutes "copying"
for section 106 purposes. The facts involve a third-party commercial
service (Peak) performing computer maintenance and repair through, in
part, the necessary reloading of customers' diagnostic or utility software
activity that had only been authorized (by MAD to the actual software
owners themselves. The Ninth Circuit finds RAM copies to be "fixed,"
and thus holds the "copies" infringing.
The MAI court concedes some ambiguity among the available
authority, including Formula and the CONTU report (arguably a form of
legislative history, though prepared by a commission rather than
Congress), all vaguely affirming that loading a program into the memory
of a computer (never defined) could potentially qualify as "reproducing"
it.' 38 This is indeed a plausible effect of the 1980 amendments, as it could
potentially be partially multiplicative, for example, to load a program onto
several computers (or a multi-tasking computer) simultaneously. But it
would not follow that such a provision must necessarily ensnare all
temporary "copies," even those not meeting the traditional standard. 39 For
what it is worth, the House Report from 1976 indicates a clear intent to
exclude at least some forms of ephemeral copies from the definition of
fixation. 4 ' While only giving examples in terms of technology common
at the time,' 41 the general reference is to "purely evanescent or transient
reproductions.' ' 142 This is also consistent with Section 101's minimal
threshold for fixation requiring more than a "transitory duration" (not
defined), which the Ninth Circuit opinion implies that RAM copies satisfy
(a rather moot point, though; just because it is minimally fixed does not
mean it is duplicative of a work). This view would later be expanded even
to digital "intermediate copies" for only "the briefest of existence" in

137. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (1993).
138. Id. at 518-19.
139. By my standard, the transient nature of certain memory is significant not because it could
not plausibly be deemed minimally "fixed," but because it is facilitative of-not substituting
for-the originally-fixed work.
140. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 53 (Sep. 3, 1976).
141. The examples included television, film projections, and momentary computer memory.
Id.
142. Id. Once again, this is most likely a clarification of a norm as opposed to an "exception."
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Tiffany Design Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc. 143 The MA!-plus
approach was perhaps attractive to courts impatient for Congress to
confront the perceived inadequacies of a decades-old Copyright Act.
Where exactly does the MAI court go wrong? Could RAM data ever
constitute a "copy" under the originalist approach? Perhaps of a work of
authorship that is itself fixed in RAM (some forms now are minimally
stable so as to arguably warrant protection for whatever creative purposes
they do serve), but such a limited existence would rarely achieve
overlapping uses with more versatile data fixations (e.g., CD, DVD, hard
disk).'" Though the first party to store a program, song, or movie might
well also have been the first to place it in RAM at some point, the purposes
of that first RAM-fixation are not what are later repeated by the purely
facilitative RAM in a playing device or even a diagnostic repair
computer.'45 Even if the rightsholder then also ran and played it through
RAM first, this is not a creational fixation-but simply a utilization of the
finished work.
Analogously, a sandcastle might be a copy of another sandcastle, while
still being subreproductive' 46 of, say, a sculpture-even one with
"substantially similar" content-if the latter is fixed so much more
durably, portably, as to render the immobile and highly-transient
sandcastle an inadequate substitute. Substitutability remains critical.
Moreover, because most digital means of use are purely instrumental
pursuant to the author's design. Any data, generated incident to
143. Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Nev.
1999).
144. As noted later, even a very different (e.g., less stable) data storage format might
sometimes multiply use of a computer program (e.g., loading simultaneously)-depending on a
given program's purpose(s). Of course, a CD or DVD player could conceivably be made to hold
substantial portions of a work in memory for substitutable use even after the disk is removed, but
this is not how the buffers are now arranged; moreover, a user should also have to intend to use the
player multiplicatively rather than facilitatively.
145. Section 101 does allow for protection for works in various stages of progress. While it
is clear under my standard that computer RAM or CD and DVD memory buffers do not "copy" the
particular physical objects that end-users have purchased (or purchased the authorization to make
directly themselves, in the case of commercial Internet downloads), a question still might arise
whether users are copying any prior incarnation of the works. But even this is doubtful. See 17
U.S.C. § 101. Though programming, recording, editing, may utilize RAM-even
creationally-these uses are not comparable to the use for which household RAM gets employed
in enabling the ultimate consumption of the works. MAI should have had to show that Peak's RAM
data was designed to duplicate some purpose for which the program was made. I do not deny that
evolving technology may indeed be shrinking gaps between what various objects could be used for,
but the fundamental standard has not changed; plaintiffs should at least still have to successfully
argue that substantial substitutability and substitution occurs, in order to prevail on 106(1) grounds.
146. This would not speak one way or the other to the sandcastle potentially being a derivative
work.
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experiencing the work accordingly, probably lacks the requisite creative
contribution to qualify as a derivative work-be it original, infringing or
authorized. Hence, most consumer RAM use would not generally
implicate copyright. I next look to another instance of a court grappling
with the reproduction right in the context of computer memory.
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc. 47
' Is the other significant pre-DMCA case. It involves the
issue of Internet service provider (ISP) liability for Usenet postings. The
district court notes that, per MAI, statutory "copies" were made in the
hardware infrastructure belonging to the defendant. 4 However, it
distinguishes on the matter of causation, finding that customers initiating
the infringing activity were the only parties who could be directly liable. 1'
At most, the ISP could potentially incur indirect liability (contributory or
vicarious). The court expresses concern that "[a]lthough copyright is a
strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or
causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
create a copy by a third party."' 5 ° While the reasoning is more sound than
in MAI, the court's reliance on policy concerns (fear of stifling the
Internet, adequacy of existing protection) does venture beyond a statutory
originalist rationale.' 5
The defense had argued that an ISP is merely a conduit with respect to
infringing material, and thus statutory "reproduction" occurs no more there
than in analogous passive facilitators of more conventional means (e.g.,
common carriers). 5 2 The Netcom court, largely sympathetic to this
functional-equivalence rationale, also rejects a counterargument that
holding ISPs directly liable could be good policy because it forces them
to take all feasible measures to minimize infringing activity (which is, of
course, an argument for what the law should be-not what it is). 3 More
recently, CostarGroup,Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. 54
' did offer some post-DMCA
validation of Netcom-rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the ruling
had only been a temporary bridge to the DMCA.'55 This case correlates
56
culpability with volitional initiation-an intent-level short ofwillfulness'
147. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.1995).
148. Id. at 1368.
149. Id.at 1369-71.
150. Id.at 1370.
151. See generally id.at 1361.
152. Religious Tech. Cr., 907 F. Supp. at 1370 n.12.
153. Id. at 1375.
154. Costar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
155. Id. at 549, 552-54.
156. See id.
at 549-51. Copyright has never required that a copyist realize the illegality of his
action in order to be infringing.
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but higher than pure strict liability (as with vicarious liability).' 57
Though the Copyright Act was augmented in 1980 (Part IV) and in
1998 (Part VI) to patch certain perceived shortcomings, there is scant
indication that Congress ever supplanted the traditional reproduction right
with a broader conception. The standard thus still centers upon a purported
reproduction bearing substantially similar purpose-suitability to a
protected work. (Going back to "printing" and "reprinting," the
reproduction right has always targeted multiplication of experiential use.)
Moreover, a copyist's intent in making or using an object is arguably a
distinct element of the proscribed activity. Today, as in 1908, many things
one might colloquially call "reproduction" are actually nonduplicative uses
falling within no present exclusive right-frustrating copyright owners,
who then seek judicial recourse. But as Justice Holmes lamented, Congress
has not seen fit to grant wholesale control over everything pertaining to a
work's "meaning and worth."
I have now covered the development of the reproduction right up to the
most recent major legislation concerning it-the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, which is the topic of Part VI.
VI. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
In this final section, I examine the most recent amendments to the
current statute, coming from the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act;
I show that they, like the 1976 and 1980 legislation, still do not disrupt the
White-Smith substitutability and like-purpose standard for reproduce and
copy. This legislation is based heavily upon the "White Paper," a report by
the National Information Infrastructure (NIH) Task Force (and its prior
draft, the "Green Paper").158 While positing a most sweeping reproduction
right,159 it presents itself mainly as an argument for how purportedly
existing law could be applied in a digital environment. More importantly,
the DMCA text does not change the language of section 106 or section 101
so as to increase the scope of section 106(1).
157. Id. This may be the most compelling recent authority affirming an intent and purpose
element to the reproduction right; deliberateness need not be explicit if it is deemed intrinsic to
"reproduce" and "copies."
158. Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (1995).
159. Id. § I(A)(6)(a). This portion on the reproduction right makes the unqualified assertion
that "[i]t has long been clear under U.S. law that placement of copyrighted material into a
computer's memory is a reproduction of that material," parenthetically invoking the statutory
definition of"copies."As discussed in Part III, this not only mischaracterizes the noun, but neglects
any analysis of the operative verb and phrase.
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Nothing in the statute or its legislative record supplies, ratifies, or
otherwise implies any definitional change to "reproduce" and
"copies"-hence the reproduction right remains after the DMCA what it
was before.16 Again I emphasize the exclusively congressional power to
alter the federal copyright bargain: if the Nil Task Force desired a
substantive expansion of the reproduction right, then that is what it should
have sought. Instead, the NII took the position that such a content-usage
right was already a given-independent of any additional copyright
measures. On this, the White Paper relies entirely upon its view of preDMCA law, because new legislation could hardly become enacted merely
by convincing Congress that it has already enacted it (a far cry indeed
from bicameralism and presentment).
So, did the White Paper accurately represent existing law? Professor
Litman suggests that the IITF Report (commenting on the 1994 draft) does
assert rights for copyright owners which exceed the section 106
enumeration.
By vesting copyright owners with control of any reproduction or
transmission of their works, and then defining reproduction and
transmission to include any appearance, even a fleeting one, of a
protected work in any computer, and any transfer of that work to,
from, or through any other computer, the Draft Report's
recommendations would enhance the exclusive rights in the
copyright bundle so far as to give the copyright owner the exclusive
right to control61 reading, viewing or listening to any work in
digitized form.'
She also observes that the report effectively espouses "the evolution of the
reproduction right into something more
encompassing than envisioned in
162
any copyright revision until now.',
David Nimmer responds that neither MAI nor the White Paper
constitute any threat to traditional copyright jurisprudence-only the
160. Even if in 1998 Congress had misperceived the scope of the 1976 reproduction right as
being broader than it actually was, a congressional misunderstanding of prior legislation would not
serve to amend it. (If anything, it shows a lack of perceived need-and thus a lack of intent-to do
so.) Even within any limited secondary role that legislative history might legitimately perform in
informing a textualist approach, one Congress's belief about another Congress's intent so long ago
is hardly probative of it. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947); United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
161. Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 31-32
(1994).
162. Id. at 40.
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context is novel but not the principle. 63
' In commenting that a right to read
is "not a revolutionary addition to the copyright owner's exclusive
rights,"'" he seems to argue that modem technology merely facilitates the
management-thereby perhaps enhancing the inherent benefit-of those
very rights which copyright owners already do enjoy. However, this
thinking seems to already presuppose the expansive definition for copy,
for Ireadily concede that owners are entitled to any windfall accruing from
fortuitous increases in the value of their actual rights.
Turning now to the specifics of the DMCA, section 512 and the
changes to section 117 are the key provisions. By expressly permitting
those computer maintenance and repair activities that MAI had restricted,
the new subsections 117(c) and (d) have been said to imply that such
activity would be infringing but for this express exception."' Similarly,
section 512 excuses an ISP from liability for specified activities (passive
transmission, caching, nonvolitional storage, linking), provided various
criteria are met and certain procedures followed.'66 However, in neither
case would the plain language of such tightly crafted provisions rationally
permit such a profound negative inference. This then leaves only the extratextual grounds of legislative intent-and yet Congress did not even seem
to believe it was changing the law with respect to the instrumental
reproductions covered in section 117167 or the ISP activities of section
163. See David Nimmer, Brainsand OtherParaphernalia
ofthe DigitalAge,10 HARv. J. LAW
& TECH. 1, 5-9. (1996).
164. Id. at 16.
165. For example, Professor Ginsburg suggests that the inclusion of section 117(c) "appears
to confirm" that RAM copying constitutes reproduction under the Copyright Act. Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright Legislationfor the "DigitalMilennium, "23 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 141 n. 14
(1999).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
167. The report from the Senate Judiciary Committee cites MAI and a narrow purpose of
counteracting its result. "Title III of the bill amends section 117 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.
117) to ensure that independent service organizations do not inadvertently become liable for
copyright infringement merely because they have turned on a machine in order to service its
hardware components."
This legislation has the narrow and specific intent of relieving independent service
providers, persons unaffiliated with either the owner or lessee of the machine,
from liability under the Copyright Act when, solely by virtue of activating the
machine in which a computer program resides, they inadvertently cause an
unauthorized copy of that program to be made.
Sen. Rpt. 105-190, at 19 (May 11, 1998). Also, the introductory paragraph of the report refers to
this provision as a "clarifying" exemption to ensure computer servicing will not be endangered. Id.
at 2. This supports interpreting the new section 117 as at most silent on the underlying MAI
approach.
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512.168 On textualist-originalist grounds, this is of course not dispositive,
but it does dampen any hopes of attributing the purported change to
implied intent.
Other logical inconsistencies arise in the argument to expand the
reproduction right via implied legislative intent. First of all, the legislative
record mentions an early draft of the WIPO copyright treaty (implemented
by the DMCA) containing a provision, article 7, expanding the definition
of "reproduction" to include "any direct or indirect reproduction whether
permanent or temporary, in any manner or form.' ' 16 9 However, because this
proposal was too "controversial," it was abandoned and replaced with a
"statement that simply confirmed that the reproduction right in Article 9
of the Beme Convention applies fully in the digital environment." The
rejection of the proposed definition suggests that Congress thought at least
some senses of "reproduction" fall outside the legal meaning. Because the
1989 legislation implementing the Berne Convention 7 ' did not change the
reproduction right, the Senate Report only confirms that the 1976
definition still controls, albeit now "fully applicable" to the digital
environment (this is uncontested anyway; no one suggests the right got any
narrower). Admittedly, this is not irreconcilable with the HTF report, but
it means that if the IP Working Group was wrong about the existing law
(as I have argued in Parts 11 and III), then the DMCA does not save it. The
statute's text is silent on the reproductive standard, and one cannot
168. The Senate Report speaks to Section 512 in terms of providing a margin of certainty.
Rather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification of [ISP liability], the
Committee decided to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create
a series of 'safe harbors,' for certain common activities of service providers. A
service provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the benefit of limited
liability.
Sen. Rept. 105-190, at 19.
As provided in subsection (k), Section 512 is not intended to imply that a service
provider is or is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that qualifies for a
limitation of liability or for conduct that fails to so qualify. Rather, the limitations
of liability apply if the provider is found to be liable under existing principles of
law.
Id. at 21. Of course, just because Congress may not mind that the law was "evolving" in the courts
does not justify it; as I have argued, the legislative branch must affirmatively act to alter the
bargain.
169. Id. at 5.
170. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 amended much of title 17 U.S.C. to
comply with the treaty, none of which affected the definition of "reproduction."

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. I11

plausibly invoke legislative intent when the very inference sought
therefrom is explicitly disclaimed by the legislative history.
Another interesting example defies the notion of expansion-by
implication. The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997 amended Section
506 to criminalize reproduction exceeding a certain quantity. Prospective
application of MAI would have counted each of X replications incident to
each of Y uses of a work, 17' thereby counting one stand-alone copy as X
* Y copies. Senator Hatch sought to preempt this unintended interpretation
with a floor statement explaining "it is not the intent of this bill to have the
incidental copies made by a user of a digital work counted more than once
"1..,,72
This endorses the original definition for reproduction, and rebuffs
the IITF Report's assertion that all computer-memory copies have "long
been clear" to be covered by the reproduction right. Granted, the 105th
Congress's opinion on an enactment by the 94th is no more binding here
than with the DMCA, but it is no less probative on the Congressional
understanding of reproduction at about the same time-further rendering
legislative intent an untenable basis for propagating the theory of M4I and
its progeny.
As a third and final exhibit on this point, one could even look to
Congress's most recent position on the matter. Title II of the Family
Movie Act of 2005 explicitly allows technology which selectively blocks
out certain objectionable material from movies, but only "if no fixed copy
of the altered version is created" in the process. This strongly indicates that
Congress does not presently deem the RAM copies integral to the
permitted technology to constitute "fixed copies" of those stored works
whose performance they enable.
As with sections 102(b) and old 117, it is fallacious to automatically
presume that safe-harbor exemptions imply a default of liability. Surely
Congress may carve windows of legal certainty without prejudicing the
state of the law otherwise. For example, the vague "fair use" allowance of
Section 107 may well overlap with some more specific exceptions;
however, failure to elsewhere privilege a given activity would not preclude
it from also being fair use.173 In addition, the first-sale doctrine (a
limitation on the distribution right) was held to be an inherent boundary on
171. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000).
172. 143 Cong. Rec. S12689-01, 12690-12691 (Nov. 13, 1997).
173. E.g., section 112 privileges certain temporary copies instrumental to lawful transmissions,
but this should not be construed to bar section 107 from potentially covering the same activity.
Remember that section 107 redundantly exempts many things which had never even been
monopolized in the first place, so it is equally unsound to infer a presumption of section 106
liability for anything failing the fair use test. The converse is also true; just because something is
not fair use does not mean it cannot be otherwise privileged (or even that it is necessarily
multiplicative in the first place!).
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the original concept of "vending" long before such a limitation was
expressly codified in section 109.174 So, perhaps the 105th Congress did
not know exactly how broad the reproduction right was, and did not wish
to delve into the matter. Instead, the safe route was to just offer an
automatic free pass for jumping through certain hoops. Nevertheless, if
archiving, essential steps, computer repair and maintenance, passive
transmission and storage, and caching are truly not duplicative in the
historical sense of substitutably multiplying authors' works, then no
liability should attach with or without the redundant inoculations from
section 512 or the old or new provisions of section 117.
In sum, a sound analysis of the White Paper, the DMCA text, and its
legislative history confirms that this statute did not affect the state of the
reproduction right. In 1998, as in 1909, a vexed Congress sought to
counteract certain undesirable results, but in neither case did it act to
change the traditional definition of copy. The like-purpose meaning
articulated in the 1908 decision, and perpetuated by the 1909 Act, still
stands in 2006.
VII. CONCLUSION

Novel technologies will always pose challenges to the application of
laws that could not have contemplated their arrival. This is especially true
in intellectual property; in patent law, technology is the very subject matter
in question, and in copyright law it has proved-from the printing press to
the internet-integral to the monopolies it vests. Copyright's goal of
protecting creative expression in works of authorship has always been an
exclusive right to reproduce these works. In this Article, I have traced the
progression of the reproduction right from its early roots to the present.
While it has been extended to more types of works, as well as
supplemented with additional rights, the fundamental criterion of what it
means to reproduce a work has never been redefined.
The central standard for judging reproduction under copyright law was
crystallized almost a century ago by a unanimous Supreme Court
174. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908). Interestingly, this case is
from the same year as White-Smith-with its opinion also written by Justice Day. He says the law
protects the right to "multiply and sell" works, and that the right to vend was conceived to "make
[the] right of multiplication effectual." This seems to indicate that the distribution right was
originally driven by the reproduction right-both of which were fundamentally about quantitycontrol, not content-control. I suspect this should strengthen a rationale for employing a functional
equivalence approach to modem digital first-sale analyses. Of course, it would have to be resolved
whether mere quantity-control-i.e., negating the effect of a multiplicative act-would thus be
legally tantamount to non-multiplication.
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opinion;' 75 it hinged upon the notion of suitability for like purposes
(substitutability). Congress soon revamped the system, reaffirming the
classic exclusive rights dating back to 1790 (print, reprint, publish, and
vend) in the first section of the 1909 Act, stringing within it the term
"copy" with no new definition. (Congress then detailed new rights in
subsequent sections.) The next overhaul came with the current 1976 Act,
providing in section 106(1) a continued right "to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies.. ." No statute has ever defined the activity of
reproduction (v.) and copying, but its product "copies" was defined with
direct reference to original works-which themselves get defined into
existence in terms of their initial fixation (not abstract conception). Then
in 1980, the Act was amended to help deal with software (per the CONTU
report) in some ways that'caused considerable confusion and controversy
over subj ect-matter eligibility, but even so, nothing was done that could be
said to have expanded the qualitative scope of the reproduction right.
Looking to the DMCA of 1998, this ad-hoc patchwork legislation was
likely prompted by fears sparked from MAI (and the trend it
foreshadowed), and the prospect of hindering internet service, computer
repair, and other technologies. This law is best understood as a legislative
insurance policy designed to inoculate specific activities from the
consequences of a judicially-expanding reproduction right. 176 This is
evident from the narrowly-tailored language of the safe-harbor provisions,
bolstered by consistent legislative history, and confirmed by the internal
inconsistencies of arguments purporting to invoke legislative intent to
support a negative inference of "default" liability. No policy was set by
Congress other than to secure a margin of safety for a particular class of
prospective defendants. This neither affirms nor rejects the deviant case
law that placed said defendants in such jeopardy in the first place;
sidestepping controversial precedent is not tantamount to ratifying it. As
I have argued, it would be counterfactual to construe every statutory safeharbor provision or clarifying exemption as an implicit declaration of
presumed liability.
Therefore, the exclusive reproduction right should still be analyzed
according to the historical meaning outlined in Parts H and HI. As of now,
the standard still turns on duplication and multiplication and arguably even
purposeful direction (intent) towards that end. Not the 1976 Act, nor its

175. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
176. I avoid discussing the policy merits (e.g. how much ISP-liability is "best")--sticking here
to matters of analytical interpretation. If anything, though, strict adherence to the boundaries of the
exclusive rights makes it easier to defend them more absolutely--without need for many
exceptions.
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1980 amendments, nor the 1998 legislation broadens in substance this
traditional definition. 177
Many courts thus far to confront digital reproduction seem to accept
(with astonishingly little challenge) that even facilitative, instrumental data
replication is within the reproduction right. Even most defenses offered (as
in MA/) erroneously concede that as long as substantial expressive content
from a work gets taken and minimally fixed, that a statutory "copy" (n.)
is in fact made-leaving themselves only such recourses as fair use,
copyright misuse, or some altruistic appeal to the statute's supposed higher
purposes. Applying the interpretive approach of statutory originalism to
the copyright law calls for a prompt reinstatement of the only meaning for
reproduce ever enacted-that first articulated in White-Smith and
perpetuated ever since. The terms of federal intellectual property bargains
should not be recast outside of the democratic lawmaking process, and
there is copyright precedent for correcting a longstanding misallocation of
rights. Perhaps a paradigm rooted primarily in the notion of discrete
physical embodiments of expressive works of authorship is antiquated
today, but it remains our system, for better or for worse. Unless and until
Congress acts affirmatively to alter the fundamental right to multiply one's
creation, the theory of MAI should be repudiated, and "to reproduce.., in
copies" should be restored to its original meaning: multiplying or
substituting the creative purpose(s) of an original work of authorship, in
light of the ultimate sensory experiences for which the author's
object-the first copy-was initially fixed.

177. This is why, for example, I do not focus principally on the question of "permanence"
versus "transience," for that is but one possible way to demonstrate nonmultiplicity. The
substituability standard is therefore adaptable to changing technology (it only cares about actual
electron behavior to whatever extent necessary to draw a comparison of respective purposes in the
particular case at hand).
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